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What Is Critical Theory Today? (And What Is 
It For?) 
Brian Milstein* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first generation of the Frankfurt School assembled at a time of ever-deepening crisis in 
Western modernity, when the classical liberal system of capitalism came crashing down and 
fascist and totalitarian regimes were on the rise. Faith in democracy was on the wane, ethno-
nationalist sentiments were reaching fever pitch, and millions found themselves stateless 
and rightless. We are in a strange way fortunate that, thus far, the era of Brexit and Trump 
appears more a farce than the tragedy of that earlier time. The encroachments against social 
democracy by resilient neoliberalism, nationalist resurgence, and democratic disenchant-
ment appear much more mild and subtle this time around, but, precisely for this reason, the 
changes we currently see for the worse are more likely to go unchecked and sediment into 
the long-term path of our societies. Thus, the idea of a critical theory of society, conceived 
with an emancipatory intention, is important today in a way it has not been for a long time. 
And yet what we today call ‘critical theory’ and the way it conceives itself has 
changed dramatically over the last 80 years. The term itself is usually traced to the Frank-
furt School, and oftentimes it is still used to describe a specific kind of Frankfurt-
descended theoretical orientation or intellectual lineage. But critical theory has in actuali-
ty become far more diverse. Say “critical theory” in the United States, and one is just as 
likely to think of Foucault, Derrida, or Agamben as one is of Horkheimer, Adorno, or Ha-
bermas, and there are settings in which critical theory is associated almost exclusively 
with the former group. The umbrella can be extended further to include approaches draw-
ing variously on poststructuralism, agonism, pragmatism, political liberalism, postcoloni-
alism, phenomenology, gender, racial, and ethnic studies, queer theory, STS, and more. 
Open today an academic journal or book series or visit an international conference that 
describes itself as dedicated to ‘critical theory’, some mixture of these influences is bound 
to be present. The internationalization of critical theory over the last half-century has 
brought them all into dialogue with one another, to the point that it is no longer possible 
to consider one school of thought without considering the way it has influenced, is influ-
enced by, and positions itself in relation to the others. And there is no uncontroversial 
way to say which of them definitively belong to critical theory and which do not. 
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While this diversity of voices makes it difficult to characterize critical theory as a whole, 
I would still say there are at least a few major theoretical, methodological, and political 
commitments we could identify that lend to critical theory something like a ‘center of gravi-
ty’. I will do my best to remain even-handed, though my reading will be based on the Frank-
furt tradition. Using this reading as a baseline, I will then look at the path contemporary criti-
cal theory has taken, some of the lines of contention that have arisen among present-day crit-
ical theorists, and some of the challenges it faces as we grapple with contemporary problems. 
My perspective is necessarily partial and even partisan—as well as ‘(U.S.) American’—and I 
cannot claim to have answers to the questions I raise. Indeed, I have written this as much to 
clarify my own thoughts on these matters to myself as to convey them to others. 
1. A Minimalist Sketch 
Thomas McCarthy perhaps best summed up critical theory’s project when he described it 
as “the critique of impure reason” (McCarthy 1994: 243). At its root, critical theory is a 
metatheoretical position on the irreducible sociality of human reason, with a sharp eye to 
the ways in which that reason is institutionalized in social discourses, practices, relations, 
and forms of knowledge—and with an even sharper eye to the forms of distortion, aliena-
tion, and domination that these may entail. Particularly in the form it developed in West-
ern societies, reason, whatever powers of enlightenment (if any) it may harbor, is intrinsi-
cally impure; it is only ever encountered as historical and multiple, divided against itself, 
and out of joint; its promise is emancipatory but also fugitive; it is at once the tempter, 
savior, and trickster of modern complex societies. To the extent that most strands of criti-
cal theory today share in this basic impulse, they can be said to share some basic method-
ological commitments.1 
First, critical theorists share a suspicion of both ‘positivistic’ approaches to social sci-
ence and overly ‘contemplative’ approaches to philosophy, advocating an approach that 
combines philosophical reflection with social analysis. While not all schools take their 
lead directly from Horkheimer, his indictment of the mutual renunciation of science and 
philosophy does capture the idea succinctly. The pretension of the social sciences to a 
purely ‘objective’ and ‘value-neutral’ view of the world as a collection of observed facts, 
correlations, and causal relations reduces the social scientist to a mere technocrat, devoid 
of reflection on society as a greater whole or the hopes, fears, ideals, and sufferings of 
those it comprises. Conversely, philosophy’s preoccupation with unearthing a ‘pure’ and 
unconditioned reason amounts to a strategy of avoidance of the messy realities of the so-
cial world; cowered in the shell of a transcendental subject detached from social or histor-
ical context, its normative purview remains restricted to the personal knowledge and eth-
ics of an individual who encounters society only passively. In Horkheimer’s view, the 
very division of science from philosophy is the historical product of a certain ‘rational-
ized’ division of labor in capitalist society that produces knowledge tailored to the needs 
of its own reproduction—isolated, manipulable facts, coupled with an individualized con-
ception of the knowing and acting subject—while systematically constricting our abilities 
to take account of the larger whole (Horkheimer 1999). 
                                                        
1 Some of the points made in this section are discussed at greater length, though in a somewhat different 
way, in Milstein (2015: 5 ff.). 
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Second, most schools of critical theory share a general intuition that reason, as it has 
developed in the course of (Western capitalist) modernity, does not exist merely in the 
subjective consciousness nor as a mere ‘tool’ that can be freely employed, but as some-
thing integrated deeply in societal practice in such a way that generates a certain kind of 
knowledge, reproduces certain kinds of social relations, and promotes a certain concep-
tion of the self. Such societal practice extends beyond science and philosophy to all areas 
of society—economic relations, state administration, culture, art, family life, medicine, 
and so on—but the lesson for the theorist is there is no external Archimedean point from 
which to take stock of the entire complex. Accordingly, critical theory sets for itself the 
task of not only making sense of this complex of societal rationality, but doing so reflex-
ively with regard to one’s own place within that complex. One is never merely an ob-
server of social life but always already a product of it, as well as a participant in its re-
production. This does not necessarily mean that there can be no objectively valid 
knowledge of the world, but, to the extent that there is, it is always an interested objec-
tivity. Thus, where the positivistic social scientist tries to deny or neutralize the interests, 
biases, and value-laden character of knowledge, the critical theorist strives to make them 
explicit, open, and available for philosophical reflection and scrutiny; and where the con-
templative philosopher searches for unadulterated access to pure rationality, the critical 
theorist looks to situate the development of rationality in broader historical and social 
contexts. 
Third—and finally—most agree that the societal rationality native to Western moder-
nity harbors uniquely modern forms of domination that are deserving of critique. At the 
very least, there is something in rationalized forms of social life that constrains or pre-
vents us from acting or living in ways we might otherwise want or find somehow more 
fulfilling. Accordingly, the social analysis in which critical theory is engaged is from the 
very outset pursued with a definite practical interest. Many strands, particularly those in-
spired by the Hegelian-Marxist tradition or the Frankfurt School, formulate this as an in-
terest in emancipation, though not all. But however various theorists might formulate the 
practical interest of critical social analysis, virtually all are today committed to a norma-
tive stance that is uncompromisingly antipaternalistic: the practical interests of theory can 
only be derived from the hopes and ideals of the everyday social actors themselves. This 
rules out utilitarian or strongly consequentialist understandings of normativity, and, while 
it often embraces versions of the critique of ideology, hegemony, discursive formations, 
or subjectivity, it remains cautious about what the theorist may claim about the ‘true’ or 
‘false’ consciousness of social actors. Most critical theorists today, including those who 
still draw inspiration from Marxism, thus remain highly skeptical of the ‘vanguardist’ 
theories of twentieth-century Marxist-Leninist movements. 
Now, while these three methodological themes are more or less shared by the bulk of 
those who describe themselves as critical theorists, not all of them would state them in 
precisely these terms. Indeed, while all agree on the need for a social critique of modern 
rationality as it is conceived, practiced, and institutionalized in Western modernity, deep 
lines of contention are drawn over rationality’s normative status. Habermas is best known 
for distinguishing between “communicative” and “instrumental” reason in order to sal-
vage the emancipatory promise of the tradition of Enlightenment rationality from the gen-
eralized ‘will to mastery’ evidenced in modern technology, industry, and bureaucracy 
(Habermas 1984-7). Others insist that, in whatever guise reason may come, modern ra-
tionalism is bound to be, if not outright domineering or coercive, then at least in some 
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way homogenizing, alienating, manipulative, or depriving. This is not the debate I want to 
get into here—at least not directly. 
Instead, I want to concentrate on a few specific points. I want to look, first, at the pre-
sent status of the idea of critical theory as a mode of analysis that aspires to capture a 
view of society ‘as a whole’ and, further, how this aspiration relates to critical theory’s 
‘emancipatory’ intentions. Second, I will consider briefly two contemporary approaches 
to translating the insights of critical theory into political practice. And since I was invited 
to contribute to this symposium as a representative of critical theory in the U.S., I will 
close with a few concerns about its future in the Anglo-American academy, which is cur-
rently proving itself in a troubling way to be not only an observer of modern-day capital-
ism but also a participant. 
2. Taking Society as a ‘Whole’ 
In Traditional and Critical Theory, Horkheimer framed his critique of theory in terms of a 
Marxist reading of the social division of labor. The traditional theorist is dually divided 
from the emancipatory needs of the subjected classes insofar as, first, the division of labor 
in society at large gives the traditional theorist the faulty sense of epistemic privilege 
from which she can understand herself as a neutral observer of society, and, second, the 
intellectual division of labor within the academy and civil services compartmentalizes the 
production of knowledge in a way that inhibits analytical access to the social whole with-
in and for which knowledge is produced. Only with reference to the ‘whole’ can the theo-
rist gain an appropriately critical appreciation of how rationalized knowledge is config-
ured by capitalist society for its own reproduction. The idea of Sozialforschung referred to 
an interdisciplinary intellectual program that combined philosophy, sociology, political 
economy, psychology, law, and cultural theory precisely to gain intellectual traction on 
the whole.  
Even in more ‘pessimistic’ works such as Dialectic of Enlightenment, the value of 
taking stock of the social whole remained key to critical theory’s perspective. It remained 
a concern for the early Habermas as well, though Habermas was already warier of the dif-
ficulties of attributing “unity” to historically contingent complexes of social development 
(see Habermas 1973: 251). Nevertheless, his two-volume Theory of Communicative Ac-
tion (1984-7) has long been considered the last major attempt to grapple critically with 
society as a whole. Today, attempts to theorize society on this scale are quite few. Luh-
mann’s systems theory comes close in certain ways, and while rational choice theory 
claims the ability to analyze all aspects of society, it is not a theory of society.2 
                                                        
2 In the American academy at least, even critical theory is rarely employed for this purpose. Instead of using 
it to pull together research from across disciplines, scholars are more likely to draw from the critical theo-
ry ‘canon’ that which is deemed relevant to their own discipline. Political theory, for example, draws on 
Habermas’s theories of deliberative democracy and the public sphere, but largely leaves behind his work 
on legitimation crises, lifeworld pathologies, Marxism, and critiques of scientism. Various other speciali-
zations, such as critical security studies, critical legal theory, aesthetic theory, media studies, cultural stud-
ies, or literary theory, also draw on particular aspects and works of critical theory. Theory-minded sociol-
ogists are more likely to have broad training in the Frankfurt School and other strands of critical theory; 
however, it is mainly in select philosophy departments that one is most likely to find broad expertise in 
critical theory’s full range. 
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Indeed, whether a critical accounting of the social whole with emancipatory intent is 
possible or even desirable is today a topic of contention. The twentieth century’s experi-
ences with totalitarianism already put a heavy damper on the idea of attempting to render 
society analytically transparent for the purposes of deliberate steering, and even life under 
postwar social democracy was subject to widespread criticism over the forms of social 
control, alienation, and loss of meaning generated by over-rationalized forms of life (Ar-
endt 1998; Marcuse 1991; Foucault 1977; Habermas 1984-7). Foucault, for example, was 
highly skeptical of the idea of a social whole and believed it “dangerous” to theorize in 
such terms, arguing that societal rationalization was a much more haphazard collection of 
disparate processes that could only be analyzed in the particular (Foucault 1982: 210; 
1988: 27 f., 35 ff.). At the very least, the conceit of an all-encompassing social science of 
the style once pursued by Marxists and, to an extent, the early Frankfurt School, seems ra-
ther excessive (see Saar 2017). 
At the same time, the generalized ‘fear of the social’ characteristic of the mid- and 
late twentieth-century developed largely in the heyday of the European welfare state, 
when the problems of capitalist crisis and class conflict that motivated Marxist theory 
were thought largely resolved (Habermas 1975). And yet the return of major crisis follow-
ing the 2007/8 recession, along with its prolonged social and political aftermath, seems to 
have reintroduced the question of the social whole in a new way, as growing exploitation, 
disaffection with democracy, and nationalist resurgences appear as large-scale systemic 
problems (Mair 2013; Streeck 2014; Müller 2016). This presents twenty-first century crit-
ical theory with a dilemma. On the one hand, the worries inspired by the over-bureau-
cratization of society, with the specter of totalitarianism still hovering in the background, 
still hold valid as precautions about the risks of ‘grand’ emancipatory theorizing. On the 
other hand, if it is the case that capitalism, its crisis tendencies, and its propensities toward 
extreme stratification are once again urgent sources of domination and pathology calling 
for emancipatory critique, it is hard to see how critique can continue to refrain from theo-
rizing on a large scale—not only with respect to large systems like the economy but also 
with respect to the ways they interconnect and come together to structure social life 
(Strecker 2012; Fraser/Jaeggi forthcoming). While we may still do without an all-
encompassing theory of society, we do stand in need of a systemic theory of society. The 
question facing critical theory could be stated thusly: Is it still possible to theorize the so-
cial ‘totality’ with an emancipatory intent that does not itself become ‘totalizing’? 
Difficulties only multiply when the question is posed in a global context. Independently 
of what emancipatory value reason might have in Western societies, the postcolonial cri-
tique takes aim at rationality’s entanglements with colonial domination and its legacies. It 
can be questioned even to what extent and in what manner critical-theoretic concepts like 
‘emancipation’ can be fruitfully utilized in non-Western contexts (Chakrabarty 2000; Mi-
gnolo 2007). And yet the increasing multiculturalism within societies and interconnected-
ness between them, as well as the undeniably global nature of contemporary capitalism, 
suggests a need to be able to theorize at a global level, and this in turn suggests a need for 
transnational coordination according to ideas and norms in whose formulation all can partic-
ipate as equals. Reconciling these two realities may require a ‘provincialization’ of emanci-
pation and other concepts, yet it points also to a more arduous process of developing the 
conceptual language necessary to confront global challenges. 
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3. The Political Ambitions of Emancipatory Theory 
Related questions arise when we ask about the link between emancipatory theorizing and 
political activity. The orthodox Marxist tradition from which early critical theory de-
scended sponsored a more or less clear trajectory toward ‘revolutionary’ praxis, but for 
the early Frankfurt School this had already become muted as an explicit goal. The early 
generation’s tendency to give off an appearance of political directionlessness, especially 
during its more pessimistic turn of the postwar years, was part of what led Lukács to 
mock them as having “taken up residence in the ‘Grand Hotel Abyss’”, living the lifestyle 
of bourgeois academics while passively musing about the downfall of civilization (Lukács 
1971: 22). 
For most critical theorists today, the antipaternalist commitment of critique prioritizes 
some version of an intensive democratic ethos—that is, an ideal of democratic freedom, 
equality, and collective self-determination that is more than merely ‘formal’. Critical the-
ory is highly skeptical of approaches that cast philosophers and theorists in the role of 
‘moral experts’ who prescribe principles for society independently of the views of every-
day social actors. How these requirements are to be interpreted, however, is a matter for 
debate. Discourse theory grants that while we cannot dictate normative political principles 
independently of the real-time deliberations, contestations, and struggles of society’s par-
ticipants, it is nonetheless possible to theorize the prerequisites and conditions under 
which participants can successfully formulate valid principles for themselves. Here the 
program of critical theory merges with the theory of deliberative democracy as a means 
for the reconstruction of liberal-democratic institutions with regard to their ability to enable, 
channel, and remain responsive to processes of democratic opinion- and will-formation 
from below (Habermas 1990, 1993, 1996; Benhabib 1996, 2006; Bohman 2000, 2007; Forst 
2002, 2012). 
Critics of this deliberative-democratic approach worry it already acquiesces too much 
to historically given liberal ideas and practices to be an effective critic of them. By taking 
the Western model of liberal democracy to somehow already harbor the prerequisites for 
‘ideal’ political deliberation and will-formation, it covers over the historical contingen-
cies, power relations, and blocking of alternative paths that informed its development 
(Honig 2009). Moreover, discourse theory tends to rely on Kantian and formal-pragmatic 
premises that more radical skeptics of reason fear still claims too much ‘transcendental’ 
normative authority, imposing on societal participants an image of a ‘rational actor’ that 
may bring with it its own artificial constraints as well as propensities toward hegemonic 
domination and unwelcome homogenization. Thirdly, there is a concern that deliberative 
theory, by focusing on the conditions of ‘ideal’ discourse and democratic consensus-
formation, becomes too far removed from real-life political struggles to be of much use to 
emancipatory movements (Azmanova 2012). 
Drawing on the work of Arendt, Schmitt, and Heidegger, agonistic or ‘radical’ de-
mocracy strives to locate the critical potential of political action in moments of confronta-
tion and struggle whose energies originate at least partially from ‘outside’ the established 
institutional order. Drawing on conceptions of ‘the political’, ‘constituent power’, ‘begin-
nings (archê)’, and ‘dissensus’, this approach locates political critique in extra-institutional 
displays of resistance that disrupt the logic of prevailing hegemonies (Rancière 2001; 
Mouffe 2005; Markell 2006; Kalyvas 2008; Ingram 2013). Its virtue lies in how it links 
theory directly to political practice in a way that is comparatively rare (though not non-
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existent) in the deliberative literature. The caveat, however, is that agonistic theory seems 
able to validate the critical moment of extra-institutional action only so long as it remains 
extra-institutional. Once resistance loses its spontaneous and unpredictable form, it loses 
its emancipatory luster and once again merges back into the system. This incorporates in-
to theory an important corrective against excesses of utopian or vanguardist thinking. But 
it raises questions about how far this can be taken as a methodological bar to explicit 
normative or organizational theorizing, or whether there is a point at which theoretical 
concerns about the hegemonizing force of reason or the effects of institutionalization be-
come ‘too theoretical’ to serve as a useful guide to political action. 
Similar concerns to those raised above are also relevant to critical theory’s capacities 
to theorize emancipatory politics. At national and transnational levels, present-day gov-
erning institutions continue to grow increasingly distant and unresponsive to the concerns 
of citizens, taking on the appearance of being ‘democratic in name only’ while answering 
more and more exclusively to the imperatives of politically insulated technocrats and fi-
nance capital (Crouch 2004; Mair 2013; Streeck 2014). This is being met on the other side 
by right-wing populist movements and fragmentation of democratic constituencies across 
Europe and the Americas (Müller 2016; Judis 2016). A few exceptions notwithstanding, 
emancipatory movements have struggled to generate successes comparable to the Brexit 
referendum, Trump’s election, entry into governing coalitions as in Denmark, Austria, or 
Czechia, or the outright takeover of governments as in Hungary or Poland. 
It does not seem that either purely normative theorizing about the conditions of ra-
tional discourse or faith in spontaneous moments of resistance is sufficient on its own for 
the tasks at hand. Democratic institutions are already approaching too desiccated a shape 
to expect the required normative policy prescriptions to be adopted through ‘normal’ poli-
tics, while a quasi-spontaneist strategy in the style of Occupy Wall Street cannot provide 
the coordination and long-term momentum needed to mount a sustained offensive against 
neoliberal technocratization and right-wing nationalism. Nancy Fraser, for example, has 
suggested thinking again in terms of “hegemony” and “counter-hegemony” as a part of a 
renewed emancipatory democratic strategy (Fraser 2015: 172 ff.; Fraser/Jaeggi forthcom-
ing). Critical theorists might also take note of the recent ‘partisan turn’ in democratic the-
ory (White/Ypi 2010, 2011, 2016; Wolkenstein 2016; Invernizzi-Accetti/Wolkenstein 
2017; Ebeling/Wolkenstein 2017; Bonotti 2017; Efthymiou 2017). This area is still in rel-
ative infancy, and it has thus far remained largely within the confines of analytic ideal 
theory. However, a critical theory of political partisanship—perhaps joined with a theory 
of counter-hegemony or other critical-deliberative or agonistic perspectives—may be an 
idea worthy of exploration. 
4. Looking in Our Own Back Yard 
The intention behind these reflections is largely to note some of the tasks critical theory 
faces as it encounters the challenges of the present era. It is by no means intended to be 
exhaustive, nor is it meant to be a full survey of current work (my Hegelian colleagues 
have been sadly neglected). Above all, it is not meant to be an indictment of existing 
work. And as difficult as these challenges may appear, I do believe that contemporary 
critical theory has the capacity to —if not resolve them—contribute powerful insights in 
how to confront them. But there is one area about which I’m less sanguine. 
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It is noteworthy that Horkheimer’s original indictment of ‘traditional theory’ included 
a critique of the division of labor in the academy itself, and that his idea of pursuing a 
critical theory of society required a breaking down of not only the boundary between phi-
losophy and the social sciences but a variety of disciplines in order to gain a critical per-
spective on society as a whole. Today, the pressures of academic life, especially in the 
U.S. and U.K., point precisely in the opposite direction. Particularly for junior and non-
tenured scholars, success in the academy requires an ever more strict adherence not only 
to disciplinary boundaries but also to specializations within disciplines. To the extent that 
interdisciplinary specialization is permitted or encouraged, it is sharply limited. Moreo-
ver, the de-funding of higher education and the emphasis on acquiring grants steers schol-
arship toward research projects of interest to those who can fund grants, which are primarily 
states, corporations, and a handful of NGOs. In addition, the dependence on grant funding, 
along with administrative and government demands that scholars justify the immediate 
‘practical use’ and ‘policy relevance’ of their work, discourages the kind of broad theoreti-
cal engagement with the larger picture that was the hallmark of critical theory. 
Thus, if there is one further area that stands in urgent need of critical theory’s atten-
tion, it is the academy itself. Many of critical theory’s successes over the past several dec-
ades have been in challenging various academic discourses with regard to their unacknowl-
edged presumptions and hidden biases. But little critical-theoretic attention is paid today 
to the broader social-institutional complex in which theory is generated, including critical 
theory. As critical theorists who are (or aspire to be) working scholars, we remain at the 
end of the day participants in a social division of labor. Universities in the U.S. and U.K., 
for example, are changing rapidly, with politicians and segments of the public demanding 
trimmed-down curricula focused on technological development and vocational training. If 
the production of theory plays a role in the reproduction of the societies in which we live, 
then we need to examine how the rise of the ‘corporate university’, the precariatization of 
academic labor, the increasing subjection of scholarly work to administrative surveillance, 
and incentive structures that emphasize metrics such as impact factors may come to alter 
the way theory is produced in the future. If there were ever a question on which we need 
to think of ourselves as not only observers of society but also participants, this is surely 
one. 
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